

Cybersecurity Zusammenfassung

Security & Cryptography

↳ it's about communication in the presence of adversaries

Relay Attack

↳ intercept and relay communication between two parties
to gain unauthorized access to a system or to information

ex relay car key signal from the house to the
car to trick the car into opening, as it thinks
the key is nearby

Countermeasure

↳ Distance bounding protocols

↳ check timing between communication and calculate
distance based on timings

How to Achieve Security

- **Security Policy**
 - ↳ **Confidentiality** → who can access
 - ↳ **Integrity** → who can modify
 - ↳ **Availability** → ability to access data at any time
 - **Threat Model** → Assumptions about the adversary
 - **Mechanism** → Hardware & Software Implementations to achieve security/privacy.
- ⇒ policies have to be followed, up to date and you always need the right set of assumptions.
- This is an iterative process and therefore prone to vulnerabilities
- ⇒ every system has a breaking point
- ⇒ the more secure a system is,
the less likely it is to be attacked

Confidentiality

→ can be achieved using encryption

Encryption

↳ a secret key is used to encrypt a plaintext using some kind of an algorithm.

This can later be decrypted using another secret key.

Integrity

↳ Determine if contents have changed

Checksums

↳ use a function to map contents to a numerical value. This value can then be checked to see if the content has changed.

Types of Threats & Attacks

- Eavesdropping → listening in on communication
- Alteration / Tampering → change contents of communications
- Denial of Service → Block access to something
- Masquerading (Impersonating)
- Brute force → try everything until success

Protection Mechanisms

- Access Control → control who can do what
- Secret key cryptography → encrypt & decrypt using a key

Malware

- can be classified into several categories

- Propagation

- ↳ Virus → human-assisted propagation (ex: open email attachment)
- ↳ Worm → automatic propagation without human assistance

- Concealment

- ↳ Rootkit → modifies OS to hide its existence
- ↳ Trojan → provides desirable functionality but hides malicious operation

- Various Types of Payloads

- ↳ from annoyance to crime

Computer Virus

- ↳ Software that can replicate itself by modifying other files/programs to insert code
- ⇒ needs some type of user assistance

Behaviours

- Slow down System
- Auto-run or close applications
- Display pop-ups
- Corrupt files and may cause system crashes

ex: Cryptolocker → encrypted files and demand ransom

Virus Phases

- **Dormant Phase** → sleeps to avoid detection
- **Propagation Phase** → replicates itself to new files/systems
- **Triggering Phase** → logical condition that triggers the virus
- **Action Phase** → performs malicious actions

Virus Concealment

- Encrypted Virus → encrypts payload
 - ↳ anti-virus can use decryptor to detect
- Polymorphic Virus → random encryption variation
- Metamorphic Virus → variable internal structure
 - ↳ rewrites itself

Computer Worms

- ↳ spreads copies of itself without human interaction

Behaviour

- carry malicious payload ex: deleting files, installing backdoors
- replicate rapidly, causing system to slow down
- can be controlled remotely

Development

- find vulnerability
- write code to exploit it
- generate target list
- install & payload execution
- querying/reporting if a host is infected

Trojan Horse

↳ malware program that masquerade as legitimate software but steals sensitive information

Behaviour:

- does not replicate itself
- captures important data

Rootkits

↳ designed to infiltrate machines, give attackers remote control and remain hidden for extended periods
⇒ hard to detect by software that relies on the OS itself.

Adware

↳ ads delivered to a user via software payloads

Spyware

↳ Software that spies on the users activity

Logic Bombs

- ↳ malware that performs malicious action as a result of a certain logic condition
ex. crash system on date XY

Backdoor

- ↳ hidden feature in a program that allows a user to perform actions he should normally not be allowed to

Malware Zombie

- ↳ can turn computer into a zombie → machine is controlled externally to perform attacks

Cryptohijacking

- ↳ maliciouss crypto mining → utilizes machine resources to mine crypto

Signatures

- ↳ malware countermeasure

A virus has a blueprint, some sort of signature that can be calculated based on its code.

These signatures can be matched by an anti-virus software

Buffer Overflow

↳ program writes more data to a block of memory than it is supposed to hold.

This extra data then overwrites adjacent memory.

This can lead to unexpected behaviour.

⇒ attacker could rewrite a return address and point the program to some malicious code

Protection

→ canary bytes

↳ random bits that come after the buffer.

A Program can then verify if these bits have been overwritten, as they are known

IP Address

Subnet
128. 148. 32. 110
~~~~~      ~~~~  
network      host

## IP header

### includes:

- source address
- destination address
- packet length
- Time to live (TTL)
- IP protocol version
- Fragmentation information
- Transport layer protocol information

## Denial of Service (DoS)

↳ making a target system/network resource unavailable for its intended use

⇒ sends large number of packets to host providing service

↳ slows down, or crashes host

↳ often executed by botnet

## Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)

↳ used for network testing & debugging

↳ simple messages encapsulated in single IP packets

### Tools based on ICMP:

→ Pings

→ Traceroute

## ICMP Attacks

### Ping of Death

- ↳ Sends a ping request that exceeds the maximum size of a ping request. The network splits this request into fragments. On reassembly, the target machine fails to reassemble correctly as the size exceeds the maximum. This leads to a buffer overflow. → target host crashes

### Smurf Attack


- ↳ Large number of ICMP packets are sent with a faked (spoofed) source address. Responses will all go to the same address, flooding the machine with traffic
- ↳ Slows target system down to unusability

## IP Vulnerabilities

- Unencrypted transmission → ability to eavesdrop
- no source authentication → ability to spoof
- no integrity checking → forge content, redirect, etc..
- no bandwidth constraints → denial of service

## TCP SYN Flood Attack

- TCP connections are established in a 3-way handshake



Bot sends SYN request faster as Server responds

with SYN/ACK and never returns ACK, resulting in the overload and eventual stop of traffic

⇒ Denial of Service

## Firewalls

↳ integrated collection of security measures designed to prevent unauthorized electronic access to a networked computer system.

⇒ predefined set of rules to filter incoming and outgoing traffic

## policy actions

- Accepted → permitted through firewall
- Dropped → not allowed through, no indication of failure
- Rejected → not allowed through, inform source of rejection

## Stateless Firewall

- ↳ processes each packet without regard to any packets it processed previously
  - ⇒ Firewall keeps no state

## Stateful Firewall

- ↳ can tell when packets are part of legitimate sessions
  - ⇒ Maintain tables of active connections

## Tunnels

- ↳ end-to-end encryption of traffic

## Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

- ↳ actively monitors your computer/network for malicious activity & alerts you when it detects an attack
- Signature based detection
  - ↳ keeps list of attack signatures and compares incoming threats to this list
- anomaly based detection
  - ↳ monitors for system anomalies through established baseline

## Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)

↳ blocks attempted attacks instead of just alerting

### challenges of intrusion detection

- Accuracy and Detection Speed
- High detection rate
- low false alarm rate

### Detection rate :

$$DR = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}$$

TP → True Positive

FN → False Negative

### False Alarm rate:

$$FA = \frac{FP}{TN + FP}$$

FP → False Positive

TN → True Negative

### Zero - Day Attack

↳ An attack that is unknown and therefore unaddressed by security experts

⇒ no patches, fixes or signatures are known

## Caesar Cipher

↳ shift each letter  $X$  positions in the alphabet

$X$  = secret key

⇒ to decrypt shift each letter back by  $X$

⇒ only 25 possible keys → easy to crack

## Substitution Cipher

↳ assign each letter of the alphabet another letter and substitute them

↳ bijective (one to one) function

↳  $26!$  possible keys

⇒ can be cracked using frequency analysis, as the frequencies of individual letters are statistically fixed in each language, when there is a large enough text.

## Exhaustive Search Attack

↳ Brute Force Attack

⇒ check every possible key

⇒ key space must be big enough to make a brute force attack infeasible

## Crypto System

↳ pair of algorithms (Encryption, Decryption) that take a key and convert plaintext to ciphertext and back

$K \rightarrow \text{Key Space}$   
 $M \rightarrow \text{Message Space}$   
 $C \rightarrow \text{Ciphertext Space}$

} Cipher can be defined over  $(K, M, C)$

$E \rightarrow \text{Encryption Algorithm} \Rightarrow E: K \times M \rightarrow C$

$D \rightarrow \text{Decryption Algorithm} \Rightarrow D: K \times C \rightarrow M$

Therefore  $E(K, M) = C$

$D(K, C) = M$

## Symmetric key Encryption

↳ using the same key for encryption & decryption

$\Rightarrow$  needs a secure way of sharing the key

## One-time pad (OTP)

- ↳ theoretically unbreakable encryption technique, when used correctly
- generate a unique, completely random key that is at least as long as the plaintext.
- convert plaintext into numerical form.
- for each letter of the plaintext, add the corresponding letter from the key. If the result is greater 26, subtract 26.
- result modulo 26 = encrypted letter  
$$\Rightarrow m_i + k_i \% 26$$
- ⇒ reverse process to decrypt
- ⇒ Secure if every key is used only once, otherwise, the messages can be decrypted without knowing  $k$ , as
  - $c_1 = m_1 \oplus k$  ,  $c_2 = m_2 \oplus k$
  - $\Rightarrow c_1 \oplus c_2 = (m_1 \oplus k) \oplus (m_2 \oplus k)$   
 $= (m_1 \oplus m_2) \oplus (k \oplus k)$   
 $= (m_1 \oplus m_2)$

## Stream Cipher

- ↳ uses a fixed-sized key to generate a pseudorandom key stream
- ⇒ use pseudorandom key stream to encrypt like OTP does.

## Pseudo Random Generator

- ↳ takes a short random number (seed) and outputs a long string, that looks random
- ⇒ A good PRG must be unpredictable

## Block Cipher

- ↳ plaintext is split into same-sized blocks. each block is then encrypted into a same size block.  
Padding is added if the sizes between blocks don't match.

## Meet in the Middle Attack

- ↳ Attacker knows a plaintext, ciphertext pair in a double encryption system. He can now try to find a key that brings him from the plaintext to the ciphertext.
  - ⇒ This brings down the complexity and therefore makes brute force a feasible attack.

## Modes of Operations for Block Ciphers

- **Electronic Code Block (ECB)**
  - ↳ encrypts each block of the plaintext independently
    - ↳ simple & easy to implement
    - ↳ two identical blocks result in the same ciphertext block
- **Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)**
  - ↳ each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block
    - ↳ uses an initialization vector for the first block
    - ↳ requires sequential processing
- **Counter (CTR)**
  - ↳ converts block cipher into a stream cipher.  
Encrypts a counter & XORs it with the plaintext  
The counter is incremented each block

# Public key Cryptography

↳ triple of efficient algorithms

- $\text{keyGen} \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \Rightarrow$  randomized key generation that outputs a private - & secret - key
  - $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m) \rightarrow c \Rightarrow$  randomized encryption algorithm that outputs ciphertext  $c$
  - $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c) \rightarrow m \Rightarrow$  deterministic decryption algorithm that outputs the plaintext  $m$  that corresponds to the ciphertext  $c$
- $\Rightarrow$  randomized encryption  $\rightarrow$  never the same ciphertext

$\Rightarrow$  easy to verify, hard to crack

## key exchange

↳ how to make sure a key really belongs to the person i am trying to talk to?

↳ give key in person

↳ Secure channel

↳ requires certification of each party

## Certification Authority (CA)

- ↳ issues certificates to certify partys

## One-Way - Functions

- ↳ easily computable in one direction, hard to compute the inverse
  - ⇒ ex. factoring large numbers
    - ↳ easy to multiply, hard to find factors

# RSA (Rivest - Shamir - Adleman)

↳ private & public key encryption, where the shared secret is computed using the public key of the other party.

⇒ 1. choose two large prime numbers  $q$  and  $p$

2. multiply them

$$n = p \cdot q$$

$$= \phi(n)$$

3. choose a number  $e$  that is coprime to  $\underbrace{(q-1)(p-1)}$

4. calculate the inverse  $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(q-1)(p-1)}$

⇒ private key :  $d$

public key :  $e$

Encryption:

$$\text{Enc}(pk, m) \rightarrow c$$

$$c = m^e \pmod{n}$$

Decryption:

$$\text{Dec}(sk, c) \rightarrow m$$

$$m = c^d \pmod{n}$$

⇒ It is hard to compute  $\phi(n)$  given only  $n$ .

Coprime → Two numbers are coprime, if their greatest common divisor (GCD) is 1.

## Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA)

- ↳ Attacker is able to compute ciphertext for chosen plaintexts.

As RSA gives the same ciphertext for the same plaintext every time.

The goal is to gather enough information to deduce the decryption key, or decrypt other ciphertexts without access to the key.

## Homomorphism

- ↳ property of encryption schemes that allow for operations to be performed on ciphertexts, which, when decrypted yield the same result as if the operation had been performed on the plaintexts

⇒ allows for operations over encrypted data

⇒ RSA has this property:

$$\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_1) \cdot \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_2) = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_1 \cdot m_2)$$

## Diffie - Hellman Protocol

↳ secure key exchange

1. choose public parameters

↳ choose a large prime number  $p$

↳ choose a generator  $g$  with  $g$  being the primitive root modulo  $p$  ( $g^a \bmod p$  can generate every integer from 1 to  $p-1$  with some  $a$ )

2. both parties choose a random integer as their private key:  $a, b$

3. compute Public keys:

$$A = g^a \bmod p$$

$$B = g^b \bmod p$$

4. exchange Public keys

5. compute shared secret:

$$s = B^a \bmod p$$

$$s = A^b \bmod p$$

⇒ relies on the discrete logarithm problem

↳ retrieving  $a$  from  $A$  is computationally infeasible

# El Gamal Encryption

↳ public key cryptosystem based on Diffe-Hellman

1. choose a prime number  $p$

2. choose a generator  $g$ , with  $g$  being the primitive root of  $p$  ( $g^a \bmod p$  can generate each integer between 1 and  $p-1$  with some  $a$ )

3. select random integer  $x \in \{1, 2, \dots, p-2\}$

4. compute  $h = g^x \bmod p$

⇒ Public key:  $(p, g, h)$

Private key:  $(x)$

Encryption:

$$\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m) \rightarrow c(c_1, c_2)$$

$$c_1 = g^r \quad (r \in \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\})$$

$$c_2 = m \cdot h^r$$

Decryption:

$$\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c) \rightarrow m$$

$$m = c_2 \cdot c_1^{-x}$$

⇒ randomized encryption scheme  $\rightarrow$  CPA secure

⇒ homomorphic

## Discrete Logarithm Problem

⇒ given  $y = g^x \pmod{p}$ , find  $x$

⇒ This can only be solved by trying every possibility,  
therefore making it a strong foundation for cryptographic  
protocols. (ex. El Gamal, Diffi-Hellman)

## Data Integrity

↳ assure data has not been modified in an unauthorized  
matter

→ Modification can be deletion, insertion, reordering ...

## Man in the Middle Attack

↳ third party intercepts the initial key exchange  
and establishes a channel to both parties.

He can now intercept messages and decide to relay  
them or change them.

The two original parties think they are communicating  
directly.

## Cryptographic Hash Functions

- ↳ maps long messages into fixed size bit strings
  - ⇒ This is called a checksum or fingerprint
  - ⇒ Hash Function should be one-way, making it unfeasible to generate a message with a specific hash.

## Collision

- ↳ two different inputs produce the same output

## Collision Resistant

- ↳ A function is collision Resistant, if it is hard to find collisions for it.

- ⇒ There is no explicit, efficient algorithm to generate collisions

- ⇒ Collisions will always exist, as the input space is much larger than the output space

# Hash Function Requirements

1. Variable Input size
2. Fixed output size
3. Efficiency
4. Preimage resistant (one way)
5. Second preimage resistant
  - ↳ (find a hash that matches the hash of a given input)
6. Collision resistant
  - ↳ (find two inputs for the same hash)
7. Pseudorandomness
  - ↳ (output seems random → small input change = big output change)

weak hash function → property 1-6

strong hash function → property 1-7

## Birthday Attack

↳ Hash Function Attack based on the Birthday Paradox

### Birthday Paradox

↳ In a group of 23 people, the probability of two people sharing a birthday is  $> 50\%$ , as there are  $\binom{23}{2} = 253$  possible pairs and each pair has the possibility of  $\frac{1}{365}$  of sharing a birthday.

### In Hash Functions:

- A n-bit Hash function has  $2^n$  possible values.
- ⇒ The Birthday paradox states that you now only need  $2^{\frac{n}{2}}$  different inputs to have a chance of  $> 50\%$  to find a collision.
- ⇒ n-bit Hash Function has  $\frac{n}{2}$  bit security against the Birthday Attack

## Merkle - Damgård Construction

↳ method to build hash functions that produce a fixed length output

1. Split input in a sequence of same-sized blocks
2. add padding to ensure all blocks are the same size
3. generate a hash using the first block and a initialisation vector
4. generate the second hash with the previous hash and the next block

⇒ Iterative hashing

⇒ Hash function needs a block & a hash input

⇒ if the compression function is collision resistant, the overall hash function will also be collision resistant.

## Password Hashing

- ↳ Password is hashed and the output is saved
  - ↳ to check the input password hash input and compare hashes
- ⇒ one way & more secure way of storing passwords

## Vulnerability

- ↳ people use weak passwords
  - ↳ attacker can build a dictionary of common passwords and their hashes (rainbow table)

## Improvement

- before hashing, add a randomly generated value (salt) to the password and then hash it. Save the hash and the plaintext salt. (\$ salt \$ hash)
- ⇒ on verification, take the plaintext salt and add it to the input. Then compare resulting hashes
- ⇒ makes a rainbowtable attack more costly  
dictionary attack

## Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- ↳ used in crypto system to ensure integrity
  - uses a message and the shared secret key to generate a short tag
  - MAC is sent along side the message, so that the receiver can verify the integrity by computing the same MAC and comparing his and the received one
- $$\Rightarrow \text{MAC}(k, m) \rightarrow t$$

## Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- ↳ MAC is generated by computing a temp MAC for each block and using it to generate the next MAC. The MAC from the last block is the final MAC.
- $$\Rightarrow \text{given message } M \text{ and } \text{MAC}(M), \text{ an attacker could add data and generate the new MAC for it.}$$

## Encrypted Cipher Block Chaining (ECBC)

- ↳ uses a second key to encrypt the tag, that was generated from CBC.

## Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

↳ uses hashing algorithm to generate secure MACs

⇒ as long as the Hash Function  $H$  is secure, HMAC is secure.

$$\text{HMAC} = H \left( k \oplus \text{opad} \parallel H(k \oplus \text{ipad} \parallel m) \right)$$

Secret key

concatenation  
(Verkettung)

inner hash

some fixed padding for  $H$

## RSA Signature Scheme

private key :  $d$  (secret key)

public key :  $e$

$p, q$

$$\text{Sign}(sk, m) : \sigma = m^d \mod n$$

⇒ make more secure by hashing  $m$  first

$$\Rightarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m) : \sigma = (H(m))^d \mod n$$

↳ this is secure as long as  $H$  is secure & collision resistant.

# Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

1. choose a large prime  $p$
2. find sub-prime  $q$  (prime divisor of  $p-1$ )
3. find generator  $g$
4. ( $g^a \bmod p$  generates all integers from 1 to  $(p-1)$  with some  $a$ )
5. specify a Hash Function  $H$
6. select a random integer  $x$  = private key / secret key
7. calculate public key :  $X = g^x$

Signature :  $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m) \rightarrow \sigma(r, s)$

$$r = (g^r \bmod p) \bmod q$$

$$s = \frac{(H(m) + x \cdot r)}{r}$$

$r \rightarrow$  random integer

Verification :  $\text{Verify}(\text{pk}, m, \sigma)$

$$r \stackrel{?}{=} (g^{H(m) \cdot s^{-1}} \cdot X^{r \cdot s^{-1}} \bmod p) \bmod q$$

⇒ everyone can verify a message using the public key, no need for individual keys.

# Secure Socket Layer (SSL) & Transport Layer Security (TLS)

↳ protocols designed to provide secure communication over a computer Network.

⇒ TLS is the successor to SSL

## Goal:

- Cryptographic Security → establish secure connections
- Interoperability → ability to communicate no matter the systems
- Extensibility → ability to change encryption methods
- Relative Efficiency → ability to use session keys

## Handshake

3 parts:

- Hello messages → agree on parameters for connection
- key exchange → exchange encryption scheme specific parameters and establish shared secret
- finished message → confirm established connection & start sending data

## key exchange

↳ we can use protocols like Diffie-Hellman or any other private key encryption protocol

## Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)

- ↳ property of a secure communication protocol that ensures the confidentiality of past session keys, even if the servers long term private key is compromised
- ⇒ private key is only used to authenticate the server, not for generating a shared secret.

## TLS 1.2 vs TLS 1.3

- ↳ 6 step Handshake vs 4 step Handshake
  - ⇒ TLS 1.3 combines the Hello messages and the key exchange messages
- ↳ TLS 1.3 removed support for unsecure algorithms
- ↳ TLS 1.3 added mandatory forward secrecy
  - ⇒ TLS 1.3 is more secure and offers a simplified and faster handshake and added mandatory forward secrecy

## SSL/TLS Attacks

### - Down Attack

↳ uses vulnerability in the SSLv2 protocol to initiate a hand shake with specifically crafted messages.

This allows the attacker to gain partial information about the server's private key.

As the same private key is used for more secure TLS protocols on the same server, the attacker is able to use this partial information to decrypt session keys and therefore communication.

### - Man in the Middle Attack

### - Heartbleed

↳ uses vulnerability in OpenSSL's implementation of the TLS Heartbeat extension, that allows attacker to read memory from the server, potentially exposing sensitive data like private keys.

### - Poodle

↳ uses vulnerability in SSL 3.0's padding